eaf282c535
- TD#8 hybrid.ts: rerank_strategy {always|when_top_k_gt|never} + threshold
(default skips rerank for top_k ≤ 15; chat tool uses threshold 10)
- O11 vision.ts + tools.ts: analyze_image_region tool — sharp-crops the
bbox, claude CLI reads the temp PNG via Read tool, Sonnet vision answers
- TD#12 /graph: SigmaGraph replaces ForceGraphCanvas; react-force-graph-2d
uninstalled (-37 transitive deps); force-graph-canvas.tsx deleted
- TD#27 messages/route.ts gatherContext slice sizes via CTX_* env vars
- TD#22 tests/rag/: golden.yaml (15 queries) + run.py (Recall@k + MRR +
negative-pass rate) + baseline.json + CI job in .forgejo/workflows/ci.yml
- docs/adrs/: ADR-001..005 published from systems-atelier deliverables
Verified live on disclosure.top: top_k=5 path skips rerank (6.7s embed-only,
was 12-15s with rerank); rerank=always still available on demand.
First RAG baseline: Recall@5 = 0.2083, MRR = 0.25, Negative pass = 1.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
106 lines
4.5 KiB
Markdown
106 lines
4.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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adr: ADR-004
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title: Auth model evolution — manter Supabase GoTrue + RLS publico-read; novas tabelas case/* write-only por investigator role
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status: accepted
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date: 2026-05-23
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deciders: sa-principal, sa-security-engineer, sa-platform-lead
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project: disclosure-bureau
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---
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## Context
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Modelo de auth atual:
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- **GoTrue email magic-link**, SMTP Spacemail, `MAILER_AUTOCONFIRM=false`.
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- **profiles.role ∈ {user, admin, suspended}**, com `budget_cap_usd`, `daily_quota`.
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- **Sessoes `is_public=true`** sao readable por anon (compartilhaveis via share_token UUID).
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- **RLS publico-read** em chunks/entities/documents/entity_mentions/relations.
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- **service_role key em env do container web** (necessario para usage_events INSERT bypass RLS + admin tasks). F5 do security audit.
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Decisao de fronteira na W3: novas tabelas (`hypotheses`, `evidence`, `contradictions`, `witnesses`, `gaps`, `residual_uncertainties`, `investigation_jobs`) — quem escreve?
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## Options
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1. **service_role escreve tudo** (mesmo padrao atual). Investigator-runtime usa service_role.
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2. **Role intermediario `investigator`** com permissoes minimas. Investigator-runtime usa esse role; web nao.
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3. **Investigator usa Postgres direto sem RLS**: bypass desde o nivel de conexao.
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## Decision
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**Opcao 2: Role `investigator` granular.**
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Criar role Postgres minimo:
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```sql
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CREATE ROLE investigator LOGIN NOINHERIT PASSWORD :'INVESTIGATOR_PASSWORD';
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-- Reads (mesmo que anon ja tem, mas explicito)
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GRANT SELECT ON public.chunks, public.entities, public.entity_mentions,
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public.relations, public.documents TO investigator;
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-- Writes em tabelas case/*
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GRANT INSERT, UPDATE ON public.hypotheses, public.evidence, public.contradictions,
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public.witnesses, public.gaps, public.residual_uncertainties,
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public.investigation_jobs TO investigator;
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GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public TO investigator;
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-- Negar tudo o resto
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REVOKE ALL ON public.profiles, public.chat_sessions, public.messages,
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public.usage_events FROM investigator;
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REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA auth FROM investigator;
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```
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E:
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- Investigator-runtime container usa `postgres://investigator:${INVESTIGATOR_PASSWORD}@db:5432/postgres` (NUNCA service_role).
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- Web service continua com `postgres://postgres:...` (acesso amplo necessario para createServiceClient nos pontos especificos).
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- Em W5, **avaliar reducao de uso de service_role no web** criando role `web_service` similar com permissoes ainda menores que `postgres`.
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**RLS nas novas tabelas:**
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```sql
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ALTER TABLE public.hypotheses ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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CREATE POLICY hypotheses_public_read ON public.hypotheses FOR SELECT USING (TRUE);
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GRANT SELECT ON public.hypotheses TO anon, authenticated;
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-- Investigator role usa bypass via INSERT/UPDATE direto (sem RLS aplica em writes do owner role; ele tem GRANT)
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```
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Mesmo padrao para todas as 7 novas tabelas.
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**Modificacoes nas existentes:**
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- `relations` ganha RLS (F4). Hoje sem.
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- `messages.citations JSONB` continua mas adicionar coluna `hypothesis_id REFERENCES public.hypotheses(hypothesis_id)` se chat citar hipoteses geradas.
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**Sessions publicas:**
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Decisao do F6 (moderation_state) fica fora deste ADR porque e produto/legal, nao auth. Mas RLS aceitara extensao:
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```sql
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CREATE POLICY public_sessions_select ON public.chat_sessions
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FOR SELECT USING (
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auth.uid() = user_id OR
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(is_public = TRUE AND COALESCE(moderation_state, 'approved') IN ('approved'))
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);
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```
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## Consequences
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**Positivas:**
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- Blast radius do investigator-runtime menor (RCE no container nao acesso ao auth.users / profiles).
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- Auditabilidade granular: cada INSERT em hypotheses/evidence tem `created_by = '<detective>@detective'` + role Postgres `investigator`.
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- Aderencia a least-privilege.
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**Negativas:**
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- 1 password adicional para gerir (`INVESTIGATOR_PASSWORD`). Mitigacao: docker secrets em W5.
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- Investigator nao pode ler `messages` (intencional) — se algum dia detetive precisar contexto de sessao do user, precisa de hand-off explicito (ex: chat passar `userTurn` no `payload` do job).
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## Verification
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- `\du investigator` confirma role + permissoes.
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- Teste manual: investigator role tenta `SELECT FROM auth.users` -> erro permission denied.
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- Teste manual: investigator role faz `INSERT INTO hypotheses` -> sucesso.
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- Service_role uses count auditavel: grep `createServiceClient` no `web/`.
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## References
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- `security-audit-report.md` F4, F5, F6
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- `agentic-layer-spec.md` secao 3.2 (container env)
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- `infra/disclosure-stack/init-db.sql` (roles bootstrap atual)
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